Avoiding the Drop

As you may or may not have heard, Sports Illustrated senior writer Grant Wahl wrote a little book on David Beckham last week. The thrust of the book, put forth by Wahl in numerous interviews over the last week (including a spot on PTI and a week-long interview series on “World Soccer Daily”) is that David Beckham has basically been jerking the MLS around for the last couple of years and just using them for the money. It’s also pointed out that the Galaxy has been more successful without Beckham on the field than they have with him since his arrival in 2007. The excerpts that book have been released also paint a picture of a teammate who’s aloof and detached from the rest of his team, a player in a world separated from the rest of the club.

After reading the book, I’m really not sure that I can say that I agree with Wahl that the experiment’s been a failure. At worst, I think the experiment (if that’s the right word) is incomplete; at best, it’s possibly been more successful than it realizes.

I noticed midway through the book (which I reached on Thursday) that there was a problem: I wasn’t really finding anything that David Beckham directly did to earn the kind of bile being thrown at him. He wasn’t perfect, of course, but he seemed to genuinely have the affection of a good number of his teammates.

The perception that Beckham hired coach Ruud Gullitt is a good example of a situation where some unfair blame’s been thrown. Beckham’s people were brought in by Tim Leiweke (the CEO of the Galaxy) to find a head coach, and they ultimately submitted a list of six potential candidates. Gullitt was on it, as were (laughably) Jose Mourinho and Fabio Capello. Leiweke never reviewed the list; he hired the guy who was the cheapest. Now, technically, Beckham had some say in the matter; after all, he picked the people who put together a list that included Gullitt as an option. To say that Beckham hand picked the coach and thus bore some blame for his failures is a bit of a stretch, though; that’s like asking my (imaginary) secretary for six restaurants to go to and getting mad at me when the one you go to spits in your soup.

His interactions with players were similarly dichotomous: there was Landon Donovan’s perception of Beckham, and then there was everyone else’s. That’s a natural consequence; Donovan was rightly angry about being stripped of the captaincy, possibly frustrated that the team felt the need to go out and get a guy like Beckham in the first place, and understandably frustrated by both the losing record and the increased pressure to perform. At one point, the book mentions a startling contrast between Donovan and Beckham’s careers: every time Donovan’s faced adversity and pressure, he’s run back to L.A.; every time Beckham’s faced it, he’s risen up to occassion and overcome it. In that sense, he’s the fight to Donovan’s flight, and Donovan may not have liked that pressure and attention had followed him home.

Outside of Donovan, the rest of the team seemed to get along well with Beckham; there was a universally held notion that he wasn’t a great captain, but that’s not what made the Galaxy bad. In order, I’d say the following things contributed to the Galaxy’s terrible 2008 campaign:

1. Alexi Lalas had spent three years screwing up the roster prior to Beckham’s arrival. The MLS has an incredibly tight salary cap (or “salary budget”, if we’re using their terms) to work with; teams get $2.3 million, and they need to fill out a roster of 24 players with that cash. Between Beckham’s Designated Player cost ($400,000 ) and Donovan’s salary ($900,000), you’re now left with $1 million to fill out the remaining 22 spots. That leaves you no room for guys like Peter Vagenas (incidentally, that’s possibly the funniest name in all of professional sports), who Lalas admitted was past his prime, to come in on $144,000 a year. It also doesn’t allow you to have a guy like Abel Xavier, who was well past his prime and yet on a $156,000 a year fully guaranteed contract; when Gullitt releases him, he still accounts for 16% of the leftover salary money.
2. Ruud Gullitt’s coaching style, which mostly consisted of the team playing 11v11 every day. In fact, everything about Gullitt’s tenure was bad: he never learned the nuances of the MLS salary cap or player acquisition system, never prepped the team ahead of time for games with scouting reports,sent consistently mixed messages to his players, and made sure he was out the door before noon every day. Most damning: in spite of the fact that he had a free kick wizard on his team, Gullitt waited until four games into the season to actually start practicing set pieces.
3. Tim Leiweke also deserves a fair chunk of blame. First, he ultimately selected Gullitt from a list of coaches presented to him by Beckham’s advisors (whom he had hired on specifically for that purpose); there were five other guys on that list, though, and he took the cheapest option. Additionally, when he effectively stripped Lalas of any power he had by cutting him out of the coach hire, why did Lalas remain with the team? That’s a recipe for backroom conflict, which is exactly what the Galaxy got. Leiweke should’ve known better at multiple points in this season.

Alternatively, one could also blame the season on Beckham for not calling a team meeting.

Beckham is a transfer who hasn’t yet settled. While last year was his second season, his first year was so injury-riddled that he barely saw the field. When a player moves from Spain to England, we usually say it takes them a season to “settle in”; England’s more physical, less technical, faster, whatever. It takes some time. Wouldn’t it be fair to say that Beckham may also need a season to “settle in”? He’s gone from the best league in the world to a league that’s worked tirelessly to create parity and eliminate competitive advantages; there’s adjusting to be done there. It’s unfair to say the experiment failed before it’s complete; at worst, it’s had a bad start. There’s time for redemption here.

As far as Beckham’s commitment goes, I’m not sure that it really matters. We want him to say that he loves us, that he’s never leaving, that he’s here for the rest of time; I actually believe him when he says he’s committed, in spite of the move to AC Milan. This move means a lot of money for Beckham; I’m sure he’s committed to the paychecks he could ultimately receive.

When Beckham first came here, he came here with the understanding that his international career was mostly over and that he’d be able to put his stamp on the sport he loves in the biggest country it’s not followed in. After arriving, he was presented with the opportunity to achieve the one goal that every international player has: the chance to win a World Cup. He thought that chance was gone, but an opportunity arose to get back in and he took it. The move to Milan is a part of that. If it would serve the U.S. Men’s Team, I wish that Landon would show a little LESS commitment to MLS. Everybody has mentioned – including even Donovan – that Donovan should be going to play in Europe, where it’s more competitive and he can play at a higher level; Beckham’s in that same boat. At the end of the World Cup, he could still come back here and do what he was going to do. He’s got a clause in his contract that would allow him to invest in a franchise; that’s unheard of for a player (although most MLS salaries probably would prohibit that kind of move anyways).

Either way, the experiment was never really about Beckham and the Galaxy; it was about whether adding a worldwide star to a team in L.A. would cause more Americans to care about the sport in general. From that standpoint, it’s been a failure…but it would’ve been a failure if the Galaxy had won the MLS Cup, SuperLiga, and World Club Cup, too.

Here’s the thing: average people who aren’t in L.A. don’t really care about the Galaxy, and the ticket sales that came with his arrival will leave with his departure if those fans were just coming for the star power. Take Lebron James as an example. There was no such thing as a “home court advantage” in Cleveland before Lebron got here, and when/if he leaves the fan base will probably evaporate. We’re not really Cavs fans in Cleveland; at heart, we’re mostly just fans of the possibility of winning a major championship. Similarly, non-Clevelanders who weren’t basketball fans before won’t all of a sudden be basketball fans because Lebron plays for the Cavs; they might watch one or two games, but they’re already bored with it. He’s only a draw if people are already interested.

Same thing with Beckham. Out of context, the Beckham experiment failed because it was flawed: you won’t get people in Tucson caring about soccer by bringing a deadball specialist who’s known for crossing into Los Angeles. What WILL get the guy in Tucson is Landon Donovan’s other outfit: the U.S. Men’s National Team.

Before the Confederations Cup, we were complaining about a World Cup qualifier getting jerked from ESPN to ESPN2. The second leg of the Champions League Inter Milan-Manchested United tie was almost not televised on ESPN back in April. Compare that with this weekend: the Men’s Team won an Espy from a network that typically mocks soccer. Three games were televised on the four letter over two days. We went from having to fight for an Inter game to be shown at all to watching three Inter friendlies in one week. On top of that, this upcoming weekend MLS will enjoy two games on ESPN. The fact that the game itself is being highlighted is far more important than the players being highlighted.

All of that response is a direct result from the national team – not a club team in L.A. – having success. I don’t particularly care about the U.S. team; I’m not fascinated by how they play or by the people involved. I’m coming to realize, though, that their success is more important to the growth of this sport in the U.S. than anything that can be manufactured in a conference call between AEG and 19 Entertainment.