Avoiding the Drop

(Note: I started this around the same time that Adam actually posted his earlier piece on the Confederations Cup. I wrote too much to let it just die, and I think that mine’s different enough from his that it’s fresh. You should definitely read his, too. – MH)

Two weeks ago, most of us didn’t really know what the Confederations Cup was; now, looking back, we’re wondering why something we didn’t care about beforehand has left such huge questions in its wake. Going into the tournament, the U.S. squad was floundering; now that the whole tournament’s over and we’ve seen five games on the international stage, it’s time to talk about what the Confederations Cup has taught us.

1) The U.S. should play exclusively in a 4-2-2-2 formation.
The best moments out of this tournament for the U.S. came when they were lined up either in this formation or in it’s derivative, the 4-4-2 (they started off against Italy in the 4-4-2 and played well in the first half). The disastrous first game against Brazil was, in part, caused by the introduction of a bizarre 4-3-3/4-1-4-1 formation that called for one strong central midfielder to operate in front of the back four; we don’t have the talent, either in the back four or in the midfield, to leave that position to one guy. Once we rediscovered the formation that worked so well against Trinidad & Tobago back in April, the U.S. just seemed to feel more comfortable. Formation isn’t everything, of course; personnel plays a big part in their comfort level. Bradley will hopefully have noticed that he’s lately had his most production out of that formation coupled with a counter-attacking style.

2) Bob Bradley still has next to no creativity when it comes to utilizing personnel.
Let’s face it: nobody really thought we’d see Torres, Adu, or any of the other question marks in this tournament. We WANTED to see Torres, at the very least; instead, we got to see Kljestan and Feilhaber. This isn’t strictly an issue of initial selection, either; I can see not bringing on Torres to start a game. Substitutions, though, can make or break games; Bradley’s subs for each game were as follows:

• Italy: Davies for Altidore (66′), Beasley for Feilhaber (72′), Kljestan for Bornstein (86′)
• Brazil (First Time): Casey for Beasley (46′), Feilhaber for Altidore (60′)
• Egypt: Feilhaber for Altidore (69′), Casey for Davies (82′)
• Spain: Feilhaber for Davies (69′), Casey for Altidore (83′), Bornstein for Dempsey (88′)
• Brazil (Second Time): Bornstein for Altidore (75′), Kljestan for Feilhaber (75′), Casey for Clark (88′)

Essentially, that tells me that Altidore (even in the final, with no games to go, after Brazil had equalized in the 74′) will always come out and Casey (who is absolutely awful) will always come in. Kljestan and Feilhaber will usually sub for each other. Bradley also brought too many defenders; while Casey was really the lone option at forward, Wynne, Califf and Pearce all never saw the field. If Altidore had gotten injured (a legitimate concern), than Charlie Davies and Connor Casey would’ve had to have paired up. Not great.

That said, part of Bradley’s problem for this tournament had nothing to do with him. Injuries to several key players (Brian Ching, Maurice Edu, and Frankie Hejduk) hamstrung him on depth. However, at the moment, Bradley’s Gold Cup squad isn’t particularly competitive

3) Charlie Davies is better than anyone thought.
FOX Soccer is reporting today that Charlie Davies has attracted the attention of clubs in Germany, France, and Holland, and I totally understand why. I mentioned Davies in the recap of  last week’s Egypt game, but he’s worth talking about a little more. Davies and Altidore ultimately complimented each other very well; Altidore provoided the strong hulking threat while Davies ran the channels, chasing down loose balls and scoring from a goal-box scrum; European clubs should be looking at him.

More importantly, though, Davies fits in with the main weapon of the U.S. team: the counter. The U.S. is at it’s best when they’re coming off of a fast-break counterattack, and Davies provides the speed up top needed to get keep Donovan’s fast breaks going.

4) The whole team needs to watch their tackling, especially in front of the refs.
Three red cards in four games didn’t keep the U.S. out of the finals, and it really wasn’t the deciding factor that caused them to lose the last game. That’s not saying, though, that it couldn’t be. Whether you think the cards were fair or not (personally, I think the Clark and Bradley ones were harsh; the Kljestan one was a little wild, and probably should’ve only been a yellow, but it was definitely a card), the fact of the matter is that U.S. didn’t learn their lesson after getting the first two cards. Tim Vickery postited on Friday’s “World Soccer Daily” that refereeing standards might be more strict in next year’s World Cup due to the winter climate (his explanation of why made sense, but I can’t really recall it), while others have indicated that the issue may just be one of a bad U.S. reputation. Either way, the entire team needs to be aware of what their doing; clean tackles are one thing, but the 50/50 ones could be punished harshly. We never seemed to really learn that lesson.

Those are just four things that I’ve thought of off the top of my head. I’m interested, though, in what you learned about the team from this tournament, whether it’s good or bad. Let me know in the comments.